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ABSTRACT 
This article, somewhat against the trend in that growing body of scholarship in this area, 
argues that there is a role for a new international instrument targeting the harassment of and 
violence against journalists. It supports this position by a review of UN and regional human 
rights jurisprudence, with an emphasis on hitherto undiscussed weaknesses, as well as by an 
analysis of loopholes in international humanitarian law. It concludes with suggestions for a 
new instrument, providing better safeguards for both journalists and societal interests in the 
media, and highlights how such an instrument would tackle the problems in the existing 
framework. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite the international community’s condemnation of intimidation campaigns and attacks 
against media workers, as well as of States’ failure to investigate them, such incidents 
continue to occur. 1  Undoubtedly, ‘the murder, kidnapping, torture or disappearance of 
journalists is the most radical, violent and effective form of censorship’.2 Although individual 
journalists are the primary target of such attacks, silencing journalists additionally affects 
society at large. These attacks undermine the operation of democracy, which depends on the 
watchdog function of the media and on the free flow of ideas and information. Yet, despite 
the apparent ineffectiveness of current international norms protecting media workers in this 
regard, it has been suggested that: ‘[s]ignificant changes in the substantive legal provisions of 
international law related to the protection of journalists are not necessary; the challenge lies 
rather with the implementation of the existing normative framework’.3 We are unable to join 
                                                          
1  According to 2015 UNESCO statistics, ‘In the past decade 700 journalists have been killed 
for reporting the news and bringing information to the public: on average one death every week. In 
nine out of ten cases the killers go unpunished.’ See http://www.unesco.org/new/en/int-day-impunity-
against-journalists [accessed 6 April 2016]. The evidence shows that this phenomenon is not limited 
to war-torn or ‘rogue’ states but indeed includes the European Union; see 
https://ipi.media/international-groups-unite-to-demand-justice-in-malta-killing/.  
2 
 Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (IACmHR), A Hemispheric Agenda for the Defense of Freedom of Expression (2009), 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II, CIDH/RELE/INF.4/09, p 17.  
3 
 C Heyns and S Srinivasan, ‘Protecting the Right to Life of Journalists: The Need for a Higher 
Level of Engagement’ (2013) 35 Human Rights Quarterly 304, 330-31. See also I Düsterhöft, ‘The 
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this trend of scholarship and instead argue that there is a need for targeted legal guarantees 
for media workers which take into account the specificities of their position both as regards 
their function in society (including the rights of members of society) and the risk to which 
they are exposed.  
Our argument is as follows. First, we review the jurisprudence on freedom of 
expression. Our analysis is based on the recognition that freedom of expression has a 
distinctive societal dimension, that the media have a unique role in informing public opinion 
and, consequently, that the media are specifically at risk. We contend that there are three 
strands of weakness in the relevant jurisprudence of international human rights bodies, 
whether at regional (European, Inter-American, African) or UN level, 4 that have not been 
discussed in the relevant literature but which undermine the protection provided by the 
general human rights guarantees.  First, the approach to protecting the media’s freedom of 
expression does not, and perhaps cannot, adequately reflect the societal dimension that 
underpins the importance of the media. This under-explored aspect of freedom of expression 
is, we argue, deficient in this context. Secondly, physical harm suffered by media workers 
tends to be viewed solely as a matter of the right to life and personal security, rather than 
linking the attack to the exercise of the media worker’s profession and thus to freedom of 
expression. Thirdly, there is insufficient recognition of the problems caused by the impunity 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Protection of Journalists in Armed Conflicts: How they can be better protected’ (2013) 29 
Merkourios-Utrecht J. Int’l & Eur. L. 4.  Cf. F Foster, ‘The Price of News from the Front Line: 
Rethinking the Protection of Media Personnel under International Humanitarian Law’ (2015) 20 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 451. 
4 
 It is outside the scope of this work to inquire into the socio-cultural roots of the different 
international courts’ conclusions. Rather, we focus on the outputs of these bodies as a matter of 
positive law.  
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of those who perpetrate such attacks for public discourse. The next element of our argument 
concerns the rules relating to armed conflict. While humanitarian law recognises media 
workers as civilians, it also fails to acknowledge their distinctive role and specific exposure 
to risk. Therefore, and finally, we suggest that the adoption of a new international instrument 
for the protection of journalists, including the establishment of a non-judicial enforcement 
mechanism, would be likely better to protect both media workers and societal interests in the 
media.  
 
2. THE SOCIETAL ROLE OF MEDIA FREEDOM AND THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO 
RECEIVE 
 
While civil and political rights are individual entitlements, freedom of expression also plays a 
crucial role in the functioning of society as a whole. 5 The European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), for example, recognised the double role of freedom of expression when describing 
it as ‘one of the basic conditions for the progress of democratic societies and for the 
development of each individual’.6  Similar positions have been taken in other regional fora.7 
                                                          
5 
 For theoretical arguments justifying free speech see e.g. J Milton, Areopagitica in 
Areopagitica and other Prose Works of John Milton (London, J M Dent, 1927); J Stuart Mill, ‘Of the 
Liberty of Thought and Discussion’ in On Liberty (1860), Harvard Classics Volume 25 (P.F. Collier 
& Son, 1909); B Williams, In the Beginning Was the Deed (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
2005); T Scanlon, ‘A Theory of Freedom of Expression’ in R Dworkin (ed), The Philosophy of Law 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977).  
6 
 Handyside v United Kingdom, App no 5493/72, 7 December 1976, para 49.  
7 
 Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), Compulsory Membership in an 
Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, 13 
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Freedom of expression facilitates the spread and consideration of political, scientific, cultural 
and social ideas through the process of public discussion. It also supports transparency and 
accountability, essential preconditions for democracy. It is on the journalists’ ability to 
inform the public, and the public’s right to be informed, rather than journalists’ self-
fulfilment through the exercise of free speech that this article focusses.   
While the boundaries of the ‘media’ may be unclear, especially with the development 
of new media,8  media freedom has distinctive features as a particular form of free speech, 
which are relevant to understanding the rights of the audience and the interests of society. In 
the practice of international (quasi)-judicial bodies there is substantial support for the 
principle that, by exposing the actions of office-holders to a mass audience, bringing 
important matters to the attention of the citizenry, and conveying public support or dissent, 
the media play a prominent role in the development of democratic societies. Drawing on its 
previous jurisprudence,9 the Human Rights Committee (HRC) characterised a free press as 
‘essential in any society to ensure freedom of opinion and expression and the enjoyment of 
other Covenant rights’ and ‘one of the cornerstones of a democratic society’.10 The ECtHR 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
November 1985, para 70; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACmHPR), Media 
Rights Agenda and Others v Nigeria, Comm 105/93, 31 October 1998, para 52. 
8 
 For a discussion on the difficulties surrounding the formulation of a definition of the media 
for the purposes of international free speech guarantees see section 7 ‘The Need for Another Way?’ 
below (pages 45-63) and literature cited therein.  
9 
 Gauthier v Canada, Comm no 633/95, 7 April 1999; Marques de Morais v Angola, Comm 
no 1128/2002, 29 March 2005; Mavlonov et al v Uzbekistan, Comm no 1334/2004, 19 March 2009. 
10 
 General Comment No 34: Article 19 (Freedoms of opinion and expression) (2011), para 13. 
See also The Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa (ACmHPR, 32nd Session, 
Banjul, 2002) recognising the ‘fundamental importance of freedom of expression […] as a 
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similarly highlighted that a free press ‘affords the public one of the best means of discovering 
and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders’, 11  and that it is 
‘incumbent on it to impart information and ideas on political questions and on other matters 
of public interest’.12 The human rights bodies cast the media in the role of ‘public watchdog’, 
13
 not only with reference to public abuses,14 but also to private actions of legitimate public 
concern.15 In sum, the ECtHR sees the media as being – in relation to a wide range of topics – 
under a duty to inform, a duty of which society in general should be the beneficiary.  The 
other regional human rights bodies have taken similar stances. 16 Given that the cases in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
cornerstone of democracy’, and the ACmHPR decisions in Constitutional Rights Project, Civil 
Liberties Organisation and Media Rights Agenda v Nigeria (Comm 140/94; 141/94; 145/95, 6 
November 2000) para 36, re-affirmed in Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and Associated 
Newspapers of Zimbabwe (Comm 284/03),  para 92. 
11 
 Lingens v Austria, App no 9815/82, 8 July 1986, para 42.  
12 
 Castells v Spain, App no 11798/85, 23 April 1992, para 43. See also Sunday Times v UK, 
App no 6538/74, 26 April 1979; Jersild v Denmark, App no 15890/89, 23 September 1994 on the role 
of free speech for the democratic debate. 
13 
 Goodwin v UK, App no 17488/90, 27 March 1996, para 39. The expression was borrowed by 
the Inter-American system; see Claude Reyes et al v Chile, IACtHR Series C no 151, 19 September 
2006; Ricardo Canese v Paraguay, IACtHR Series C No. 111,  31 August 2004. 
14 
 See, e.g., with reference to the justice system, Prager and Oberschlick v Austria, App no 
15974/90, 26 April 1995, para 34. 
15 
 See Goodwin v UK (n 13); Bergens Tidende v Norway, App no 26132/95, 02 May 2000. 
16  e.g., the ACmHPR described a free press as ‘a valuable check on potential excesses by 
government’ (Article 19 v Eritrea, Comm 275/2003, 30 May 2007, para 106); according to the 
IACtHR (Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 (n 7) ‘freedom of expression is a cornerstone upon which the 
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which the ECtHR refers to this ‘duty’ have been cited in other international fora, such a duty 
may be recognised generally. Moreover, despite differences in wording between the various 
international provisions on freedom of expression,17 human rights bodies support the view 
that a democratic society presupposes tolerance of diverse, even provocative, views.18 This 
interpretation limits the extent to which governments can seek to justify repressive actions 
against commentators; politicians especially must ‘display a greater degree of tolerance’.19   
Behind these statements as to the importance of the media as critical friend, however, lies a 
risk that those in power may seek to restrain journalistic speech, with knock-on consequences 
for the audience. While the right to receive or the audience’s rights have been recognised in 
academic literature as well as in case law, they have not attracted the attention of speakers’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
very existence of a democratic society rests’ (para 70) and ‘[a] system that controls the right of 
expression … can be the source of great abuse’ (para 77). 
17 
 Articles 19(2) ICCPR, 10(1) ECHR, 13(1) IACHR, 9 ACHR. 
18 
 Handyside (n 6) para 49; Lingens (n 11), para 41; Castells (n 12) para 42; Ivcher Bronstein v 
Peru, Series C No. 74 [2001] IACHR 4 (6 February 2001); Kenneth Good/ Botswana, Comm 313/05, 
26 May 2010.  
19 
 Jersild v Denmark (n 12), para 31; De Haes and Gijsels v Belgium 24 February 1997, 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I, pp. 233-34, para 37; Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v 
Norway, App no 21980/93, 20 May 1999, para 59; Lingens (n 11) para 42.  As regards the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), see Ivcher Bronstein (n 18) paras 152-53 (deprivation of 
citizenship of television company owner criticising the authorities, where nationality was a pre-
condition for the ownership of broadcasting companies); the IACtHR expressly recalls the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence on this point. More generally on the practice of inter-system borrowing see E A Bertoni, 
‘The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights: a dialogue on 
freedom of expression standards’ (2009) 3 EHRLR 332, 348-352  
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rights, and in particular the difficulties of making them effective have not been examined. In 
this, the article addresses a gap in the literature.  
 
3. UNDER-RECOGNITION OF THE COLLECTIVE DIMENSION OF FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION 
 
Undisputedly, freedom of expression is a compound right; it encompasses speakers’ right to 
disseminate information and opinions as well as the audiences’ right to receive information 
and opinions from whoever wishes to exercise the right to disseminate them. According to 
Article 19 ICCPR, freedom of expression includes the right ‘to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas’ (emphasis added); analogous formulations can be found in the 
regional instruments.20 The HRC has recognised that the ‘public also has a corresponding 
right to receive media output’,21 an interconnectedness also stressed by regional courts. The 
ECtHR ‘has consistently recognised that the public has a right to receive information of 
general interest’;22  subject to restrictions meeting Article 10(2) ECHR criteria, that right 
‘prohibits a Government from preventing a person from receiving information that others 
wished or were willing to impart’.23 In cases concerning the seizure and ban of publications, 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACmHR) noted that ‘prior censorship … 
violate[s] the two-fold aspects of the right to receive and impart information’24 and ‘society 
                                                          
20 
 See Articles 9(1) ACHR, 10(1) ECHR, 13(1) IACHR. 
21 
 General Comment No 34 (n 10) para 13. See also Mavlonov et al v Uzbekistan (n 9). 
22 
 Kalda v Estonia, App no 17429/10, 19 January 2016, para 41. 
23 
 ibid, para 42. See also Leander v Sweden, App no 9248/81, 26 March 1987, para 74; Open 
Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland, App nos 14234/88; 14235/88, 29 October 1992, para 55. 
24 
 IACmHR, Steve Clark v Grenada, Report no 2/96, Case 10.325, 1 March 1996. 
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was deprived of its right to access to information and opinion’. 25  The IACtHR, in 
Compulsory Membership in an Association, found that ‘when an individual’s freedom of 
expression is unlawfully restricted, it is not only the right of that individual that is being 
violated, but also the right of all others to “receive” information and ideas’.26 Thus, a wrong 
suffered by an individual may also have a collective dimension.  The African approach is 
similar: in Article 19 v Eritrea the ACmHPR stated that the imprisonment of journalists 
‘deprives not only the journalists of their right to freely express and disseminate their 
opinions, but also the public, of the right to information’.27 The ACmHPR took a similar 
approach in Jawara, in relation to the politically motivated harassment and intimidation of 
journalists.28 For the ACmHPR these two aspects are indivisible.29  
While all systems recognise the dual aspect of the right, the precise nature of the 
audience’s right needs consideration. There are three points of concern.   
First, does an emphasis on the rights of the audience turn freedom of expression into a 
group right?  While international law has now accepted some instances of group rights,30 they 
                                                          
25 
 IACmHR, Alejandra Marcela Matus Acuña et al v Chile, Report no 90/05, Case 12.142, 24 
October 2005. 
26 
 IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 (n 7) para 30. 
27 
  Article 19 v Eritrea (n 16) para 105. 
28 
 Dawda Jawara v The Gambia, Comm 147/95 and 149/96, 11 May 2000, para 65. See also 
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and INTERIGHTS v Egypt, Comm 323/06, 12 December 
2011, para 152 (sexual violence against female demonstrators as a means of silencing them from 
expressing their political views). 
29 
 Scanlen & Holderness v Zimbabwe, Comm 297/05, 3 April 2009, paras 55 and 108. 
30 
 See e.g. the right of all peoples to self-determination (art 1 ICCPR); the rights of ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities (art 27 ICCPR); Vienna Declaration of the World Conference on 
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have been a somewhat contentious addition to human rights as legally actionable claims.31 
Certainly, the characteristics of group rights have been the subject of debate, though it is clear 
that the starting point is the subject (who holds the right) rather than the object (what the right 
relates to). For a group right to exist, the group must be somehow distinctive to differentiate it 
from the larger group of humanity to whom individual rights accrue. So, ‘[n]ot every plurality 
of persons qualifies as a group for the purpose of group rights. Rather, to be able to be holder 
of a right, a plurality of persons must have a certain organizational structure.’32 Indeed, the 
group should identify itself as such, 33  for example indigenous peoples or minorities. 
Nonetheless, some have suggested that the object of the right is also relevant. While 
individual rights may exist to some collective goods, others ‘are not simply reducible to 
individual interests’.34 It is possible, however, for identical but separate rights to public goods 
to be held by many individuals. Applying these considerations in the context of freedom of 
expression and the media, we might suggest that the discursive space created by the media’s 
contribution is some form of collective good. While such a space arguably can be enjoyed 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Human Rights A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993; Banjul Charter, right to equal enjoyment of cultural 
heritage: art 22(1); UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007). 
31 
 See e.g. J Nordenfelt, ‘Human Rights – What They Are and What They Are Not’ (1987) 56 
Nordic Journal of International Law 3; M Freeman ‘Are There Collective Human Rights?’ (1995) 43  
Pol. Stud. 25. 
32 
 N Wenzel, ‘Group Rights’ in R Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012). 
33 
 D Miller, ‘Group rights, human rights and citizenship’ (2002) 10 European Journal of 
Philosophy 178-195, 178; K Cronin, ‘Defining Group Rights’ (2004) 69 Irish Theological Quarterly 
99, 100. 
34 
 K Cronin (n 33) 101-102. 
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only in the context of the group, the real difficulty is the identification of ‘the group’ by 
contrast to everyone else. Arguments based on ‘society’, using the terminology of Opinion 
OC-5/85, imply a population-wide group, not a distinctive sub-group. Seen individually, 
however, everybody can enjoy a right to the output of media organisations, even multiple 
organisations with different viewpoints. In this analysis, the position of the media remains 
distinctive because an attack on their rights is also an attack on the respective individual 
rights of multiple individuals who are the audience. 
Second, even given the rhetorical references to the right of the audience to receive in 
international case law,35 this rarely translates into a justiciable claim, at least not in relation to 
media content generally (as opposed to specific information of direct relevance to the 
claimant). Khurshid Mustafa v Sweden, 36  which appears to recognise such a right, is 
exceptional. It concerned a migrant whose sole means of access to audiovisual content from 
his home country was cut off.  This case remains isolated and the ECtHR’s reasoning was 
perhaps driven by concerns about minorities’ rights rather than a generalised right to media 
content. There has been little enthusiasm for accepting an enforceable autonomous right of 
the audience, possibly because of apprehension about class actions. The ECtHR, for example, 
ruled in Akdeniz v Turkey that the claimant was not a ‘victim’ for the purposes of bringing an 
action under Article 10 ECHR when access to certain websites was blocked thereby 
rendering him unable to receive the material hosted on them. 37 His need, by contrast to the 
position in Khurshid Mustafa, was not sufficiently distinctive. Instead of assessing whether 
there was an interference with his access to content and whether it was ‘necessary in a 
                                                          
35 
 See e.g. Castells (n 12) para 43; Canese (n 13) para 88. See also Mukong v Cameroon, 
Comm no 458/91, 21 July 1994 on the importance of multi-party advocacy. 
36 
 Khurshid Mustafa v Sweden, App no 23883/06, 16 December 2008. 
37 
 Akdeniz v Turkey, App no 20877/10, 11 March 2014. 
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democratic society’, the Court dismissed the complaint for lack of locus standi. This 
approach, however, overlooks the collective aspect, ie the rights of the intended beneficiaries 
of the media’s information-gathering and dissemination activities that lie at the heart of the 
media’s ascribed value. 38  While the HRC links the media with participation in democracy, 
insofar as an individual is seen as having a justiciable claim this is characterised as the 
exercise of a vote, lying outside freedom of expression. 39 The Inter-American and African 
bodies go further in expressly recognising the collective nature of communication protected 
by freedom of expression.  According to the IACtHR, freedom of expression also implies ‘a 
collective right to receive any information whatsoever and to have access to the thoughts 
expressed by others’.40  This correlation between the right to impart, and the right to receive, 
suggests that media activities should be protected not just as interests of journalists but also 
as interests of their potential audience. Yet, despite the IACtHR’s strong statement of 
principle, even here this has not been resulted in a successful action brought by a would-be 
recipient.  
Third, insofar as we can see a recipient’s right in the jurisprudence generally, it 
concerns the right to request specific information. Thus, a self-standing right of access to 
certain publicly held information was recognised under Article 13 IACHR (e.g. information 
                                                          
38 
 Bladet Tromsø (n 19), paras 59 and 62; Axel Springer AG v Germany, App no 39957/08, 7 
February 2012, para 79. 
39 
 General Comment No 25: Article 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote), 
The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public 
Service (1996), para 25.  
40 
 Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 (n 7) para 30. 
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concerning governmental projects having an environmental impact).41 The existence of a 
right of access to information has been acknowledged by the HRC on a number of 
occasions.42 The Johannesburg Principles also recognise the right to ‘obtain information from 
public authorities’.43  While Council of Europe (CoE) soft law has recognised the right of 
access to information in public hands,44 the ECtHR has been more cautious about recognising 
this as an independent aspect of freedom of expression. 45  Initially, the ECtHR did not 
                                                          
41 
 Claude-Reyes (n 13), reflecting the earlier Inter-American Declaration of Principles on 
Freedom of Expression, adopted at the Commission’s 108th regular session, 19 October 2000, para 4.   
42 
 Gauthier v Canada Comm (n 9); Toktakunov v Kyrgyzstan Comm No. 1470/2006; and 
Rafael Rodríguez Castañeda v Mexico Com No. 2202/2012. 
43 
 The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to 
Information, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/39 (1996), 
Principle 11. Although originally the product of international non-governmental efforts, this 
instrument, adopted by a group of experts in 1995, has been endorsed by the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Freedom of Expression and the former UN Commission on Human Rights. See Article 19, The 
Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information 
available https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/joburgprinciples.pdf [accessed 23 
January 2018]. 
44 
 Recommendation (2002)2 on Access to Official Documents, 21 February 2002, para III. See 
also art 2(b) Convention on Access to Official Documents 2008, which provides for access to ‘official 
documents’ defined as ‘all information recorded in any form, drawn up or received and held by public 
authorities’. Access to information held by public authorities is, however, different from access to 
information that a private actor is willing to share, therefore the treatment of obstacles to horizontal 
communication, including media releases, is outside the purview of these instruments. 
45 
 Loiseau v France, App no 46809/99, 18 November 2003.  
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recognise the existence of such a right46 and in this it distinguished the position from the 
public’s right to receive information from the media that the media wished to impart.47 More 
recently a limited right to access information has been accepted. It is constrained to (1) 
release of specific information of public interest upon request sought by groups acting as a 
forum for public debate;48 and (2) protection against unnecessary restrictions on access to 
information arising from deprivation of liberty.49  
In sum, the broader right not to be prevented ‘from receiving information that others 
wished or were willing to impart’50 has been recognised, but only as an abstract principle 
rather than as the basis for a decision.  This is an inevitable weakness from a system which 
has difficulty encapsulating group rights and which is reluctant to accommodate class 
actions. 51  Consequently, notwithstanding the detriment to the members of the potential 
                                                          
46 
 Leander v Sweden, App no 9248/81, 10 October 1983. 
47 
 Sîrbu and others v Moldova, App nos 73562/01, 73565/01, 73712/01, 73744/01, 73972/01 
and 73973/01, 15 June 2004. 
48 
 Kenedi v Hungary, App no 31475/05, 26 May 2009, para 43; Youth Initiative for Human 
Rights v Serbia, App no 48135/06, 25 June 2013; Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, 
Stärkung und Schaffung eines wirtschaftlich gesunden land- und forstwirtschaftlichen Grundbesitzes 
(OVESSG) v Austria, App no 39534/07, 28 November 2013; cf. Bubon v Russia, App no 63898/09, 7 
February 2017 – statistics requested were not ‘ready and available’. 
49 
 See Kalda (n 22). 
50 
 ibid, para 42. 
51 
 The ECtHR has held that the individual complaints mechanism does not allow an actio 
popularis for the protection of the general interest (Klass v Germany, App no 5029/71, 6 September 
1978, para 33). Even where a measure potentially affects all the members of a particular (e.g. 
religious) group, the group as such does not have victim status for the purposes of bringing a 
complaint (Savez Crkava “Riječ Života” and Others v Croatia, App No 7798/08, 9 December 2010, 
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audience deprived of opportunity to receive content someone would otherwise have imparted, 
and despite the repeated recognition of the audience’s interest in this free flow of 
information, the audience depends on speakers’ ability and willingness to enforce their own 
rights. We do not propose to warp the entire corpus of human rights law for the sake of a 
problematic case. Rather we suggest that the interests of the audience could be better 
protected in a specific instrument designed with the media and its role in society in mind, to 
avoid opening up class actions of potentially limitless size. We discuss the outline of such an 
instrument below. 
 
4. DISCONNECTION BETWEEN JOURNALISTIC FREE SPEECH AND RISK OF 
ATTACK 
 
The exercise of freedom of expression by the media is distinctive in another way. The 
societal impact of their professional activities exposes media workers to significantly more 
risks stemming from actions seeking to prevent or limit their speech than does the average 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
para 125); see also Handolsdalen Sami Village v Sweden, App no 39013/04, 30 March 2010. A 
similar approach with regard to the right to participate in culture can be seen under the ICCPR; see 
General Comment No 23: Article 27 (Rights of Minorities) (1994), para 3.1.  Although the Banjul 
Charter recognises group rights, there are still problems with scope: see S A Dersso, ‘The 
jurisprudence of the African Commission in Human and People’s Rights with respect to people’s 
rights’ (2006) AHRLJ 358, 360. Claims to self-determination or right to cultural heritage have been 
bought by an individual on behalf of a group: Kevin Mgwanga Gunme v Cameroon, Comm 266/03, 
27 May 2009. While the Inter-American System has also recognised the rights of indigenous peoples, 
this line of jurisprudence seems linked to natural resources. It does not indicate a wider trend to group 
rights. 
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citizen. As the HRC noted, ‘[j]ournalists are frequently subjected to … threats, intimidation 
and attacks because of their activities’.52 The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary 
or arbitrary executions noted that journalists are among the persons who receive the most 
death threats.53 Despite this connection, the jurisprudence focusses on other rights engaged by 
attacks against journalists, such as the right to life, rather than looking at the attack’s impact 
on freedom of expression. The extent to which freedom of expression is overlooked, 
however, differs significantly across jurisdictions.  
The most striking example is that of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. In Gongadze v 
Ukraine,54 the murder of a journalist was assessed as a question of the State’s obligation to 
take steps to protect individuals against credible threats brought to the authorities’ attention. 
While the Court noted that journalists covering politically sensitive topics are in a vulnerable 
position, the case was decided under general Article 2 principles,55 which apply in the case of 
media workers no more and no less than other individuals.  Even where Article 10 was 
specifically raised by the applicant, the Court has found it unnecessary to consider that aspect 
of the complaint if it has already found a violation of another provision, merely because it 
‘ar[o]se out of the same facts’.56 In Killiç v Turkey, the Court thus failed to address the 
submission that the victim ‘was targeted on account of his journalistic activities’ and ‘[t]he 
                                                          
52 
 General Comment No 34 (n 10) para 23. 
53 
 E/CN.4/2003/3 and Corr.1, para 54; see also Report of UN Special Rapporteur on 
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killing was therefore an act with a dual character which should give rise to separate violations 
under Articles 2 and 10’.57  The refusal to examine the merit of Article 10 complaints once an 
Article 2 violation has been established may be seen as an unwarranted abdication from the 
Court’s role58 and a missed opportunity to highlight the impact of journalists’ assassination 
on media freedom, given that unwelcome journalistic speech is the underlying motive for the 
interference with the right to life.  
While the ECtHR has considered Article 10 in some cases, this does not constitute 
sufficient recognition of the significance of expression as a risk factor. Although the Court 
has established a positive obligation under Article 10, as can be seen in Özgür Gündem v 
Turkey, this is described in generic terms, rather than emphasizing the specific risks relevant 
to journalism: ‘[g]enuine, effective exercise of this freedom does not depend merely on the 
State’s duty not to interfere, but may require positive measures of protection, even in the 
sphere of relations between individuals’.59 Moreover Özgür Gündem, where a violation of 
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 ibid, para 85. 
58 
 See Dissenting Opinion of Judge Matscher, Dudgeon v UK, App no 7525/76, 22 October 
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 See Özgür Gündem v Turkey, App no 23144/93, 16 March 2000, esp. paras 41, 44, 49 and 
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the ECHR, stemming from their commitment to secure the effective enjoyment of the rights enshrined 
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v UK (App no 25599/94, 23 September 1998), Nielsen v Denmark (App no 10929/84, 28 November 
  
 
18 
 
Article 10 was found, may be explained by the sheer scale of the campaign of attacks and 
harassment against numerous journalists, distributors and others associated with the applicant 
newspaper, as well as search-and-seizure operations at the newspaper’s premises and 
prosecutions against the newspaper.60 In Dink v Turkey,61 the focus of the Article 10 analysis 
was largely on the criminal conviction of a journalist for articles allegedly denigrating 
Turkishness. Admittedly, there is a reference to the positive obligation to adopt measures to 
protect journalists against attacks by extremist holders of opposite views, but this is merely 
ancillary. The judgment thus reiterates the principle on positive obligations in the terms 
already established in Özgür Gündem. Nonetheless, the conclusion in the Dink case seems to 
find an interference with Article 10 based solely on Dink’s criminal conviction under 
defamation laws rather than because of the lack of protective measures.62 It therefore signals 
only a partial departure from the ECtHR’s usual approach. The more recent Mehdiyev v 
Azerbaijan judgment suggests that cases involving ill-treatment of journalists may, in future, 
be considered as raising a separate Article 10 issue. Specifically, the ECtHR did not reject as 
inadmissible the submission that Mehdiyev’s ill-treatment was a reaction to journalistic 
activities, a change from the general direction of the case law already noted. Nonetheless, it 
did not rule on the issue, merely holding that the burden of proof was not met.63 This was the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1988), CN v UK (App no 4239/08, 12 November 2012). On the judicial elaboration of the notion of 
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 Dink v Turkey, App nos 2668/07 et al, 14 September 2010. 
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inescapable consequence of the finding that the conduct complained of had not been 
substantiated.  The judgment was only able to establish a breach of Article 3 procedural 
obligations to investigate complaints of ill-treatment in custody. 64  This outcome is 
disappointing. The ECtHR avoids the necessity of considering the links between Mehdiyev’s 
journalism and the attacks.  Moreover, it does not discuss whether a separate breach arises 
from a failure to investigate under Article 10. 
These cases reveal that the ECtHR places insufficient emphasis on the risks stemming 
from the applicants’ profession and the possible chilling effect on future journalism. The only 
noteworthy recognition thereof is the reference in Dink to the importance of free public 
debate on matters of general interest in a democratic society65 and to States’ obligation to 
create a favourable environment for participation in this debate without fear.66   
By contrast, faced with comparable facts, in Njaru v Cameroon the HRC found that 
the State had violated not only Articles 7 (prohibition of torture) and Article 9 (right to 
security of the person), but also Article 19(3) ICCPR. The case concerned the arbitrary arrest, 
threats to life and torture of a journalist by police officers, in response to the publication of 
articles denouncing the corruption and violence of the security forces. 67 Significantly, the 
HRC accepted that the victim ‘ha[d] demonstrated the relationship between the treatment 
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against him and his activities as journalist’.68 It seems that the HRC expects that the link be 
proven, though it is not clear what level of proof is required.  The need for proof of the link 
between journalism and ill-treatment constitutes a second weakness in the jurisprudence that 
could weaken the protection offered here, especially if a high level of proof or probability 
turns out to be required.  
The Inter-American bodies have, similarly, acknowledged that cases of violence 
against journalists affect their individual right to freedom of expression in addition to their 
rights to physical integrity. In Gómez López v Guatemala, the IACmHR found that the 
attempt by State agents to kill a journalist was aimed at preventing the diffusion of 
photographs documenting abuses by the army during conflict, and hence amounted to a free 
speech violation.69 Likewise, in Perozo v Venezuela, the IACtHR analysed the harassment, 
physical and verbal assault in the context of armed conflict committed by State agents and 
private individuals against journalists and supporting staff as a double violation of Articles 
5(1) and 13(1) IACHR.70  In this case, where the attacks included those on a TV station and 
on journalists while they were reporting, the link with the professional exercise of freedom of 
expression was very clear. The question of whether there is, in any case involving a media 
worker, a presumption of such a link has not been directly addressed, nor has the question of 
what level of proof (if any) would be required.   
The approach of the African Charter bodies is more ambiguous. In Egyptian Initiative 
for Personal Rights, 71  the Commission found the assault on female journalists whilst 
                                                          
68 
 ibid, para 6.4. 
69 
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reporting on a protest to be a violation of freedom of expression as well as of the right to 
physical security. Since the ACmHPR seems to recognise consistently the free speech 
dimension of attacks against media workers,72 it is notable that the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHR) has not taken the same line. The link between attacks on 
journalists and the right to receive media content was raised by the applicants in Norberg 
Zongo, but the ACtHR focussed on the failure to investigate the murder, and found that it did 
not constitute a separate violation of freedom of expression,73 a restrictive approach similar to 
that of the ECtHR. Even in the context of the ACmHPR decisions, questions remain as to the 
level of proof required to demonstrate that the exercise of the journalistic profession was a 
factor in exposing the journalist to ill-treatment, or whether there is a (rebuttable) 
presumption to this effect in the case of any media worker. 
As demonstrated, there are two concerns relating to the connection between 
journalistic speech and the risk of ill-treatment: recognition of the risk; and the need to prove 
the causal relationship.  While we do not claim that all the international bodies are equally 
poor as regards the first point, all exhibit weakness in relation to the second. Moreover, the 
lack of consistency suggests that international judicial practice has not fully appreciated the 
risk factor for journalists despite the fact that part of journalists’ role is to challenge those in 
power. 
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5. THE CHILLING EFFECT OF IMPUNITY 
 
The amended UN Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 
Through Action to Combat Impunity74  defines impunity as ‘the impossibility, de jure or de 
facto, of bringing the perpetrators of violations to account – whether in criminal, civil, 
administrative or disciplinary proceedings’.75 Impunity and a credible, independent justice 
system are polar opposites. Given the link between media freedom and the public sphere, 
impunity of violence against journalists goes beyond the failure to provide redress to the 
individual victim; it also has systemic implications, as it deters others from the (professional) 
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 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of independent expert Diane Orentlicher on 
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exercise of free speech, with corrosive effects for democracy. 76  There is thus a double 
concern at play as regards impunity.   
Victims are entitled to redress in the form of prompt, impartial and thorough 
investigations, the identification, trial and punishment of the perpetrators, and non-reiteration 
measures.77 This positive obligation arises in respect of acts carried out by private parties as 
well as State actors78 and is recognised generally. The HRC underlined that ‘States parties 
should take measures not only to prevent and punish deprivation of life by criminal acts, but 
also to prevent arbitrary killing by their own security forces’.79 Further, they ‘should also take 
specific and effective measures to prevent the disappearance of individuals’ and to 
‘investigate thoroughly cases of missing and disappeared persons’.80 The regional bodies 
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have adopted a similar line.81  According to the IACtHR, this approach supports the victims’ 
right to justice and to the truth. 82   The punishment of perpetrators also mitigates the 
powerlessness of victims.83 Additionally, in order to recognise their responsibility for the acts 
committed by their personnel, but also to constitute an expression of respect for the human 
being,84  States are under an obligation to compensate.85 As Sanchez noted, this duty to 
punish is associated with victims’ ‘current’ or ‘effective’ rights’.86 It deals with the rights of 
the speaker. Whilst important, this emphasis on reparation for the direct victims and their 
immediate families is retrospective and overlooks the impact of impunity on the collective 
interest in freedom of expression.  
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Impunity is problematic in relation to any right. It is the principal cause of the 
perpetuation of human rights violations, and particularly of extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions. 87  By failing to provide disincentives to future similar behaviour, 
impunity thus has implications beyond the immediate case, rippling out through society as a 
whole.88  Yet, it has compound effects in relation to violations of freedom of expression. 
Multiple individuals (the public at large, deprived of information) have rights at stake. As 
noted by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions: ‘Journalists deserve special 
concern not primarily because they perform heroic acts in the face of danger […] but because 
the social role they play is so important. […]  Violence against a journalist is not only an 
attack on one particular victim, but on all members of the society’.89  So, the individual 
audience-members’ ‘right to a communicative environment’, as termed by Mukherjee,90 is 
threatened by impunity.  Yet this fact is not well-recognised in a judicial analysis which is 
individualistic and retrospective in form. In particular, there are two major weaknesses 
affecting the ability of international human rights law to accommodate the rights of the 
audience. 
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First, although it is undisputed that States have positive obligations with regard to 
third-party violence, 91  human rights bodies tend not to recognise a separate freedom of 
expression violation in cases concerning attacks on the physical integrity of journalists; as a 
result, there can be no consequent obligation to investigate alleged infringements of the right 
to freedom of expression.  Mehidyev is a case in point, and in this the African Court has 
followed the ECtHR. 92  Other international bodies, however, specifically identify the 
obligation to investigate such infringements. For example, the IACmHR in Héctor Félix 
Miranda forcefully held that ‘[a] State’s refusal to conduct a full investigation of the murder 
of a journalist is particularly serious because of its impact on society’.93  To some extent, the 
language of Inter-American decisions is thus more receptive to the audience’s or societal 
rights; however, in practice such references only serve as supporting arguments, whereas the 
applicant/victim is the individual or organisation seeking to impart information rather than 
the intended recipient(s). As regards the protection of any actionable rights for the audience, 
the inter-American model is therefore less revolutionary than it might seem at a first glance. 
On a related point, it could be argued that an under-recognition of the risks facing journalists 
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as a category adversely affects the State’s ability to carry out its preventative duties 
thoroughly.94 
The second weakness concerns the chilling effect of impunity, which not all human 
rights bodies have fully acknowledged. The point has been recognised in the Inter-American 
system, which admittedly has had significant exposure to the issue. The IACmHR highlighted 
the ‘chilling effect’ of States’ failure to investigate on both journalists and ordinary citizens, 
with its deleterious consequences on the flow of information in the public realm.95 It noted 
that municipal authorities’ lack of compliance with the positive obligation to prevent, protect, 
and prosecute creates a climate that is conducive to such acts.96 The Inter-American bodies 
have also emphasised the deterring effect of killings and injuries upon journalists reporting 
on armed conflict.97 At the UN level, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions noted: ‘The most extreme form of censorship is to kill a journalist. The 
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killing not only silences the voice of the particular journalist, but also intimidates other 
journalists and the public in general’.98  
Conversely, other regional courts have failed to acknowledge the weight of these 
elements. While the African Court might have recognised the potential chilling effect of 
impunity on other journalists in the Norbert Zongo case,99 in requiring proof of that effect in 
the individual case, it underestimated self-censorship and the difficulty of quantifying the 
hypothetical investigative journalism stifled as opposed to (restricted) stories actually written. 
This difficulty was emphasised in a joint separate declaration, in which the judges suggested 
that a high burden of proof in respect of the psychological effects of human rights violations 
is undesirable.100 The ECtHR as a corollary of its earlier position does not address this at all. 
The question therefore remains whether international case law has adequately or consistently 
reflected the damage to public discourse and the risks of impunity, especially in the context 
of a member of the audience who wishes to initiate a complaint.    
   
6. THE CONTEXT OF ARMED CONFLICT 
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The discussion so far has concentrated on the position of media workers in times of relative 
peace. Armed conflict situations (whether international or internal in character) pose 
increased threats to journalists’ personal security and freedom to circulate information. 
According to the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression, during many violent 
conflicts (Afghanistan, Iraq, the Middle East, Somalia, Sudan, Ossetia), ‘[l]arge numbers of 
journalists are either assassinated, wounded by direct armed attacks during the fighting or 
deliberately targeted and kidnapped by the parties to the conflict’. 101  By regulating the 
conduct of belligerents, international humanitarian law may in principle assist, but it is 
questionable whether it sufficiently recognises the specific position of the media and its role 
in informing society.  
Humanitarian law instruments do not generally confer any special status to journalists 
involved in conflict zones, save for Article 4A(4) of the Third Geneva Convention (GCIII). 
According to this provision, the ‘prisoner of war’ (POW) status in case of capture by the 
enemy extends to ‘war correspondents’, a sub-category of ‘persons who accompany the 
armed forces without actually being members thereof’ and ‘have received authorization from 
the armed forces which they accompany’.  The attribution of POW status, however, 
represents a very narrow form of protection, essentially limited to the treatment afforded once 
they have fallen into the hands of the other party.102 Further, the personal scope of this limited 
protection is uncertain.  Arguably, the notion of ‘war correspondents’ has been superseded by 
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that of ‘embedded journalists’, which also encompasses journalists who ‘live and work with 
troops on a more ad hoc basis’ without having received official accreditation.103 Whether the 
latter are ‘war correspondents’ is unclear.104 Certainly independent journalists fall outside the 
ambit of Article 4A(4). Moreover, rules for accreditation are determined nationally, so in the 
absence of an international definition of ‘war correspondents’ States can draw this category 
narrowly. Apart from these definitional difficulties, if the rationale for Art 4A(4) is that war 
correspondents accompany the troops, and therefore the treatment afforded to members of the 
armed forces fallen prisoners is extended to any non-military personnel travelling with them, 
it does not amount to a recognition of journalists’ special exposure to threat under 
humanitarian law. This lack of awareness is re-affirmed by the fact that independent 
journalists are not assigned any particular status (other than being protected as civilians).  
It might be suggested that the protection granted to the general civilian population is 
sufficient to cover media-specific risks. To explain why this position is misconceived, we 
need to review the protection available to journalists as civilians. Common Article 3 of the 
four Geneva Conventions, also applicable to non-international conflicts, establishes a 
minimum standard of treatment of persons who do not take active part in the hostilities. 
Subjecting civilians to cruel treatment or outrages upon personal dignity, or using them as 
hostages, is prohibited, as are arbitrary killings. Similarly, protection afforded under the 
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Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV) to civilian populations in situations of international 
armed conflict includes media workers. Article 79 of the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 (API), relating to the protection of victims of international armed 
conflicts, explicitly recognises journalists’ civilian status ‘provided that they take no action 
adversely affecting their status as civilians’. While the recognition in itself is a positive 
factor, ‘journalist’ is not defined and could potentially be interpreted narrowly by 
belligerents. The term’s relationship with the notion of ‘war correspondents’ in GCIII also 
remains obscure. Although Protocol I does not bind all Geneva parties (save to the extent that 
it corresponds to customary law), the belligerents’ obligation to treat journalists as civilians 
has been reiterated by UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1738 (2006).105  
As civilians, journalists are protected by three key tenets. First, they benefit from the 
principle of distinction between civilian and military objectives, which requires States to 
direct their operations solely against military objectives.106 Established in a widely ratified 
instrument, 107  this principle has arguably attained customary status. 108  The practice of 
international tribunals has indeed elevated the principle to jus cogens. 109   Secondly, 
journalists qua civilians are covered by the principle of proportionality, prohibiting 
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‘indiscriminate’ attacks, likely ‘to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, …which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated’.110 Thirdly, belligerents are required to exercise precaution to 
minimise danger to civilians.111  
According to the revised Commentary of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) on Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions,112 the obligation ‘to respect 
and to ensure respect’ for the Conventions includes a positive obligation to adopt both 
preventative measures, such as ‘instruction within armed forces’, and remedial measures, 
notably a duty ‘to search for, prosecute or extradite alleged perpetrators of grave breaches 
‘regardless of their nationality’. 113 These obligations are not, however, clearly established 
under treaty law, and the ICRC interpretation may be contested or ignored. Another way to 
tackle impunity in this context would be through the development of international criminal 
law. Although the targeting of civilians would itself amount to a war crime within the 
meaning of the Statute of the International Criminal Court,114 establishing a separate offence 
of killing journalists would provide greater recognition of journalists’ distinctiveness.115 
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Beyond this, the contention that civilian protection suffices overlooks substantial 
practical differences between journalists and other civilians. First, there may be a strategic 
advantage from targeting journalists. Special Rapporteur Frank La Rue explained that ‘the 
concern [of the belligerents] to win the war of images worsens the situation of physical safety 
for civilians and media professionals’.116 According to Levin, deliberate attacks on journalists 
and media facilities were perpetrated by armed forces and militias in many parts of the world 
‘because they posed an ideological danger in their ability and mission to spread 
[unfavourable] information to a wide audience’. 117  More generally, the media have an 
important role in informing the public about the hostilities.118 Secondly, journalists do not 
seek refuge away from combat zones; ‘[i]nstead of fleeing combat, they seek it out’.119 
Further, the location of their workplace, when their home country is the theatre of hostilities, 
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is easily identifiable.120 A further incentive to target media observers is that it makes it more 
difficult to ascertain whether States complied with IHL and to establish individual criminal 
liability. 
Their close proximity to the battlefield also exposes journalists to incidental injury 
stemming from lawful attacks against military objectives. 121  Such ‘legitimate collateral 
damage’ is not unlimited. Article 51(5)(b) API bans attacks which may be expected to cause 
civilian loss which is excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated.122  In a 
separate opinion on the Nuclear Weapons case, Judge Higgins suggested that ‘even a 
legitimate target may not be attacked if the collateral civilian casualties would be 
disproportionate to the specific military gain’.123 The classification of excessive attacks as 
war crimes 124  also acknowledges the requirement of proportionality. Nevertheless, the 
occasional targeting of journalists,125  with the consequence – and sometimes intent – of 
propagating a chilling effect, may well not be caught by these provisions, which seem 
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predicated on a subjective evaluation of the relationship between the detriment knowingly 
caused to civilians and the military advantage gained.  
Additionally, there are ambiguities in IHL rules that belligerents may exploit to 
suppress media reporting. Most conspicuous among these ambiguities are the scope of ‘dual-
use objectives’ and the mis-categorisation of journalism as propaganda, spying or treason.   
No positive norm excludes media stations expressly from the scope of ‘dual-use 
targets’, ie civilian facilities which also have a military function and which may therefore be 
a legitimate target. As a result, States may invoke military necessity to target broadcasting 
facilities.126 A notable example is the 1999 NATO bombing campaign, which treated the 
Serbian TV and Radio Station as a dual-use object, purportedly because it granted control 
over the Yugoslav army’s communications network.127 However, the 2009 Report of the UN 
Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression stated that ‘the media, its personnel and its 
equipment as long as they are not making an effective contribution to military action cannot 
be considered a legitimate target’.128 This raises the question of what may be deemed an 
‘effective contribution’. The uncertainty remains in the restatement of UNSC Resolution 
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2222 (2015) that ‘media equipment and installations constitute civilian objects, and … shall 
not be the object of attack or of reprisals, unless they are military objectives’.129  
Insofar as journalism involves acquisition and dissemination of information from the 
zones of military operations, there is a risk that it could be treated as espionage.130 The Hague 
Regulations define spying as seeking to obtain information ‘clandestinely, or on false 
pretences’ for dissemination to the hostile party.131  Journalists carrying out their activity 
openly should not be caught by the definition, by analogy with other categories excluded 
from the scope of espionage by the Hague Regulations, such as ‘soldiers or civilians, carrying 
out their mission openly, charged with the delivery of despatches’.132 Those carrying out 
more undercover investigations may be more at risk. In any event, an explicit exclusion of 
media workers along the same lines may avoid the ambiguities of domestic regulations.133  
Additionally, a journalist who ‘directly participates in hostilities’ loses his or her 
civilian status.134  This is a vague expression; the ICRC gives the example of transmitting 
tactical targeting intelligence for a specific attack. 135  The possibilities of modern live 
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reporting mean that a journalist could inadvertently provide useful information to the other 
party. The required intent to support one party to the detriment of another136 is also uncertain; 
a journalist might be intending to tell the story to the entire world, without considering that 
they are implicitly telling the story to the other belligerent party. Indirect support, such as 
favouring one side over the other, seems insufficient to meet the threshold suggested by the 
ICRC and should not lose media workers their civilian status.137 For example, in the Report 
commissioned by the Prosecutor to the ICTY on the NATO bombing campaign, the 
broadcasting of propaganda in itself was not enough to justify regarding the station as a 
military object. 138  Nonetheless, uncertainty remains surrounding the scope of ‘direct 
participants’, which may leave room for States to claim that journalists were so acting.   
Could it be argued that international human rights law compensates for shortfalls in 
protection under international humanitarian law? 139  Undisputedly, save for express 
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derogations from treaty obligations,140 human rights continue to apply in conflict situations 
alongside international humanitarian law. 141 Any derogation must be publicly proclaimed 
and notified to the human rights monitoring bodies, and observe the principle of 
proportionality. Therefore, the right to freedom of expression cannot be restricted arbitrarily 
and to an extent beyond that strictly required by the circumstances.142 The ICJ confirmed in 
Congo v Uganda that human rights and humanitarian law are not mutually exclusive bodies 
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of law and apply simultaneously during conflict.143 Nevertheless, the concurrent applicability 
of human rights law and humanitarian law during conflict does not remove the prevalence of 
IHL as the operative standard.144  The Nicaragua case suggested that a lower standard of 
diligence in the use of lethal force (typical of IHL) applies, due to the inherent difficulties of 
the war context.145 Secondly, even though the right to life is non-derogable under human 
rights instruments, it is not framed in absolute terms.146  
There is, however, a certain convergence between human rights jurisprudence and 
IHL in that excessive civilian casualties are not warranted under either body of law. Article 
51(5)(b) API, which corresponds to customary law,147 compels the occupying forces to use 
all necessary precautions to avoid the loss of innocent civilian life. Of the regional human 
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rights bodies, the ECtHR has an extensive jurisprudence, which also revolves around the 
notion of reasonable precautions and preventing by-standers from harm.148 The assessment of 
what is ‘necessary’, ‘sufficient’ or ‘proportionate’ is, however, a matter of fact, depending on 
all circumstances, and therefore may impose a lower threshold in times of war. Since 
different parameters apply when IHL is the operative standard, it is desirable to achieve 
international consensus on the recognition of safeguards for the protection of journalists, who 
do not benefit from the full extent of the protection available in times of peace but face 
different dangers when compared to ordinary civilians. Improving the normative framework 
does not seem to be, however, the prevailing approach in international fora.  
 
 
7. THE NEED FOR ANOTHER WAY? 
 
Based on the foregoing observations, it would seem that the international law regime - 
whether that found in international human rights instruments or in international humanitarian 
law  - offers minimal recognition of the role of the media in informing the public, the risks 
the media in particular face and the consequences for the public in silencing the media. 
Although the position of the media was placed on the international community’s agenda as 
early as 1973,149 specific responses have been non-binding and fragmentary, and their impact 
remains questionable. For example, the Human Rights Council’s Resolution 12/16 called 
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upon States to take all necessary measures to put an end to violations, by ensuring legislative 
compliance with international human rights and humanitarian obligations, effective 
implementation, and the availability of remedies for the victims, as well as by investigating 
threats and acts of violence against journalists. UNESCO has agreed a number of resolutions 
in the same vein,150 as have the regional bodies.151 Most notably, the 2016 set of guidelines 
adopted by CoE Recommendation on the protection of journalism acknowledges the sui 
generis nature of the exercise of freedom of expression by media workers, and it lends further 
support to our contention that violations of journalists’ rights fall within a distinguishable 
category of human rights violations, requiring a category-specific response.152 However, none 
of these awareness-raising initiatives have materialised in a coherent and authoritative legal 
instrument spelling out specific binding obligations. 
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To date, the UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity, 
launched in 2011, was the most conspicuous response of the international community to 
concerns about violence against the media. Significantly, it did not take normative action (let 
alone binding initiatives) but aimed at improving coordination amongst UN agencies, 
providing assistance to States to develop legislation promoting freedom of expression, and 
awareness-raising campaigns.153 It is a welcome attempt to address the implementation deficit 
of current international instruments, but it seems from the continuing reports of violence 
against journalists to have only marginal impact. 
At the same time, there has been evidence of an incipient, albeit modest, shift of 
attention towards the distinctiveness of media workers, especially under the IHL regime, 
when compared to other civilians. In Resolution 2222 (2015), the UNSC recognised that the 
work of media professionals ‘puts them at specific risk of intimidation, harassment and 
violence in situations of armed conflict’.154 This is a significant change in political discourse, 
insofar as, prior to 2015, the UNSC had only addressed the issue of protection of journalists 
in conflict under the more general concern about the safety of civilians.155 The specificity of 
the risks facing journalists, without the narrow reference to conflict situations, has been 
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reiterated in recent resolutions of the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council.156 
None of these bodies have, however, law-making mandate; this acknowledgment should 
therefore be taken forward by an appropriate forum with a view to legal codification.  
In that respect, we cannot share the perception that the formulation of specific 
guarantees for journalists would be redundant. The proposition that a dedicated instrument is 
superfluous because of the existence of the human rights and IHL regimes is weakened by the 
UN practice of adopting group-specific international instruments despite the existence of 
general instruments already covering those categories. Examples include the Convention on 
the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. This 
development was a reaction to the factual observation of the inefficacy of generally 
applicable rules.157 Discussing the rationale for the adoption of CEDAW, Bantekas and Oette 
note that ‘the specificity of abuses directed towards certain vulnerable groups such as women 
can be most effectively addressed through particular forms of protection and remedies’.158 
We have argued that media workers face distinct risks arising from their duty to inform, 
which risks are to some degree recognised by the soft law measures from a range of bodies. 
We have further contended that societal interests in the media are not fully recognised in the 
general jurisprudence. Additionally, an express prohibition on attacks against journalists 
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would give further impetus to the response of the international community, which is essential 
in a legal context in which peer pressure is the main enforcement mechanism of international 
law obligations.159 In IHL, ‘increased legal protections would incentivize combatants to pay 
particular attention to the physical safety of journalists’.160 
We acknowledge the difficulties with formulating specific legal provisions for 
journalists, most notably the articulation of a definition of ‘journalist’ in light of 
developments in technology.161 With the advent of the Internet, the role of ‘truth-teller’ is no 
longer the preserve of media companies’ employees162 and there is increasing evidence to the 
effect that private citizens campaigning via the Internet can suffer consequences as a result of 
that activity.163 Nonetheless, professional media are distinct from occasional ad hoc ‘citizen-
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journalists’, or what Allan calls ‘citizen witnesses’.164 What marks journalists out is their 
superior ability to reach a mass audience, no matter the platform; their credibility when 
publicising a story or idea, stemming from their professional standing and ethics (by contrast 
with other widely accessible sources); and their resources and privileged access to 
information.  Thus, not every exercise of freedom of expression amounts to journalism. As 
the Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial Killings noted, ‘journalist’ means any ‘person who 
is regularly or professionally engaged in the collection and dissemination of information to 
the public via any means of mass communication’.165   In Fontevecchia and D’Amico v 
Argentina, the IACtHR also outlined this distinction by defining the ‘professional journalist’ 
as ‘someone who has decided to exercise freedom of expression in a continuous, regular, and 
paid manner’.166  
At the same time, it is important not to define journalists in an overly restrictive 
manner. The protection should not be limited to those employed by media organisations, but 
should include freelancers, even those who do not make their living by journalism. Indeed, 
we see Fontececchia as a somewhat narrow view of journalist. Further, despite the fact that 
the case law stresses the public interest aspect of journalistic expression, we emphasise that 
State authorities should not be able to limit the application of the new instrument based on 
their assessment of what is ‘news-worthy’.  The topic of the story should not be a criterion 
but rather the intention to inform the public. Looking to function rather than institutional 
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status matches the practice of international bodies on the protection of journalists. 167 
Moreover, mass audience and professionalism are not the only fundamental distinctions 
between journalism and sporadic acts of dissemination of information by amateurs. The HRC 
has recognised the functional similarity between professional journalists and other actors 
exercising freedom of expression: ‘Journalism is a function shared by a wide range of actors, 
including professional full time reporters and analysts, as well as bloggers and others who 
engage in forms of self-publication in print, on the internet or elsewhere’.168 Crucially, a 
consistent exposure to risk exists for those who perform the journalistic function on a regular 
basis.  Some bloggers or social media ‘influencers’, as the HRC for example suggested, may 
therefore also fall into this definition, even though they are not employed by a media 
organisation.169 This does not mean, however, that an individual who retweets a news story to 
fifty followers is a journalist. 
Having singled out the media, we need to indicate that, while the journalist is the 
identifiable face, voice or name, there is a range of support workers who are indispensable to 
the collection, production and distribution of the story,170 all of whom could fall within the 
term ‘media worker’. In Perozo,171 the IACtHR recognized that Article 13 safeguards extend 
to technical supporting staff, employees, executives and shareholders of a media company. 
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The Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial Killings further suggested that those who directly 
support the work of journalists – such as stringers and drivers – should also be protected.172  
The former UN Commission on Human Rights added editors, writers, translators, publishers, 
broadcasters, printers and distributors.173 A similarly broad approach exists in the CoE: ‘all 
those engaged in the collection, processing and dissemination of news and information 
including cameramen and photographers, as well as support staff such as drivers and 
interpreters’.174 UNSC Resolution 1738 (2006) confirmed the comprehensive scope of the 
notion of ‘journalists’ for the purposes of human rights and humanitarian law.175 A new 
instrument on the protection of media personnel could follow these precedents.  
We also distinguish journalists and their associated media workers from others 
engaging more subtly in public debate through artistic forms of communication, from film to 
poetry and painting. As the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights stated, ‘[a]rtistic 
expressions and creations come under particular attack because they can convey specific 
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messages and articulate symbolic values in a powerful way’.176 Like journalists, artists are ‘at 
particular risk as their work depends on visibly engaging people in the public domain’;177 
they too face harassment, intimidation, threats, and torture.178 The authors of such artistic 
expressions can however be distinguished from those involved in journalistic activity.  In our 
view, the framework of analysis for ‘engaged’ or ‘politically charged’ art is a different one, 
insofar as artistic outputs are too remote from the characteristics of journalism outlined 
above.  As the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights acknowledged,179 creative 
expression is valuable for a range of reasons: to develop and express individuals’ humanity, 
worldview and meanings assigned to their existence and development; to entertain; but also 
to contribute to social debates. Indeed, such is the nature of this form of expression that such 
contributions bring forward counter-discourses, challenging majority views. Yet, while 
artists, writers and others may engage in matters of public interest, that is not the main 
purpose of their activity.  It is not their duty to inform on an ongoing basis, to investigate and 
to share information in a context in which an orientation towards truth and verified data is 
important. These elements, however, are central to the role of journalists.  By contrast, 
‘[a]rtistic expressions and creations do not always carry, and should not be reduced to 
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carrying,  a specific message or information’180 and the artist is not limited to or judged by 
conceptions of truth.181  Naturally, the exercise of freedom of expression by persons falling 
outside the special regime reserved, in accordance with our proposal, to the media, would still 
be protected under general human rights law.  
It should also be noted that other international treaties were successfully adopted 
despite the blurred boundaries of the categories for the benefit of which they were 
established. Defining a disabled person for the purposes of the protection afforded by the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities poses no lesser difficulties. A relatively 
straightforward notion such as the notion of ‘child’ is not susceptible of a unified definition 
under treaty law.182 Even the seemingly unequivocal notion of ‘woman’ for the purposes of 
the dedicated UN Convention may raise issues in light of the legal phenomenon of gender 
reassignment. Thus, the fact that a definition is not entirely watertight does not perforce 
frustrate all attempts at codifying additional category-specific guarantees.     
As regards the material scope of a potential new instrument, we would propose the 
same broad approach. It should include the obligation to protect the life of media workers 
(including against forced disappearance), protection against arbitrary arrest and kidnapping 
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(whether by state bodies or others), specific issues relating to the intimidation of women 
journalists,183 deportation/ refusal of entry, confiscation of, and damage to, property. We also 
propose a rebuttable presumption that attacks against media workers are linked to their 
professional activity; this is not currently clear in the jurisprudence, especially as regards this 
wider category beyond journalists. Instead, the victim appears to have to provide proof of a 
link between the attack and their professional activities, even if the level of proof expected 
may be low. A further benefit of re-iterating these rights is that it would bring into sharper 
focus the preventative obligations, such as training police and prosecutors on the specific 
issues pertaining to cases involving media workers. The implementation of the current 
standards of protection would be greatly enhanced by an express treaty obligation to instruct 
law-enforcement personnel, the military, prosecutors and the judiciary on obligations arising 
under international human rights and humanitarian law and the effective fulfilment of those 
obligations. This would include dealing with particular areas of risk for media professionals, 
such as protests and public events, the legitimacy of the presence of journalists during 
situations of armed conflict, and practices and procedures to minimize risks to journalists. 
The treaty envisaged could also re-emphasise the link between media expression and the 
violence and intimidation, thereby ameliorating a weakness in some of the jurisprudence. The 
new instrument should include provisions regarding both peacetime obligations and 
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obligations arising in conflict zones, thus providing a comprehensive codification in a single 
instrument of all the rules applicable to the situation of journalists, both under human rights 
law and humanitarian law.184 This would have the advantage of avoiding difficult discussions 
about when an internal situation of unrest has transformed into conflict, for the purposes of 
applying conflict rules. Significantly, a treaty along the lines proposed would allow the first 
formal codification of the obligation to treat journalists engaged in dangerous professional 
missions in areas of armed conflict as civilians, and respect and protect them as such (unless 
and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities), and to take all necessary steps to 
ensure accountability for crimes committed against journalists in such situations, by 
searching for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered the commission of, a 
grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. This would supersede any controversy over which 
aspects of the Additional Protocols to the Vienna Convention correspond to customary law. 
An intergovernmental drafting conference would also provide an opportunity for the 
international community to translate into law the good practices recommended in the Report 
of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on “The safety of journalists” 
of 1 July 2013 for the creation of a safe and enabling environment in which journalists and 
other media professionals may carry out their work unhindered. These include, for instance, 
the commitment to establish an effectively funded early warning and rapid response 
mechanism, in consultation with media organizations, giving journalists and media 
professionals, when threatened, immediate access to the relevant State authorities and 
material measures of protection. Specific examples of such assistance would include e.g. 
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providing mobile telephones and bulletproof vests, establishing safe havens and emergency 
evacuation or relocation to safe parts of the country or other countries through a protection 
programme. Another example drawing on the above-mentioned recommended best practices 
would be the obligation to conduct investigations into suspected attacks against journalists 
and other media professionals by a special investigative unit or an independent national 
mechanism, and to dedicate the resources necessary to prosecute such attacks through the 
development of specific protocols by prosecutors or the appointment of a specialised 
prosecutor. In addition to these measures of redress, States could also be required to take 
steps to mitigate the impact of such attacks, including by providing such services as free 
medical care, psychological support and legal services to the victims and their families. 
Spelling out and further developing, in light of international practice, the generic obligations 
of protection enshrined in current human rights and humanitarian law would give a 
substantially more concrete dimension to the applicable norms and foster national 
implementation. 
A specific instrument would recognise not only the vulnerability of media workers, 
but also the societal value in reporting events. We have noted that the individual right to 
receive is limited in this regard; some aspects of the societal interest may not be well 
represented in such a conception so that even were efforts and resources put into compliance 
with the general human rights norms generally, this would remain an area where protection 
would be weak.  Viewing attacks on journalists as presumptively being about their reporting 
may indirectly increase protection for audiences’ rights too. In terms of enforcement, we 
noted that the traditional human rights mechanisms have difficulty accommodating class 
actions, and typically only the victim may bring a complaint, at least in contentious 
proceedings. This is a structural weakness in relying on the general rights based framework, 
which even a change in the reasoning of the respective judicial bodies to consider the 
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expressive issues (in relation to the audience) separately from the physical concerns (in 
relation to a journalist) would be hard pressed to solve entirely.  It would, however, be 
possible to envisage an alternative mechanism which reflects the societal interest without 
opening the floodgates (e.g., Ombudsperson or monitoring body whose inquiry might be 
activated by a member of the public rather than the journalist-victim exclusively). Currently, 
there is a total block on these interests triggering international action; such a mechanism 
would remedy this lack as well as bringing them more into the focus of the enquiry. 
 This societal concern also suggests that the instrument should target impunity.  
Inspiration could be drawn from the wording of States’ obligations regarding investigation, 
punishment of perpetrators and reparation currently present in non-binding sets of Principles 
on Impunity at both international185 and regional level.186 The latter recognise, albeit briefly, 
the societal impact of impunity; in a specific convention on media workers, the full threat to 
public discourse could be identified. Significantly, the definition of ‘serious human rights 
violations’ in the CoE Guidelines refers to Articles 2 (life), 3 (torture), 4 (slavery), 5 (liberty) 
and 8 (private life) ECHR; there is no reference to Article 10. While the UN Guidelines are 
not substantively limited in this way, the emphasis is on the personal aspect of the right to 
justice, rather than societal concerns. Because of the general nature of these documents, 
neither raises the specific issues regarding public discourse relating to freedom of speech. 
There is therefore benefit in including specific impunity-related provisions in a convention 
aimed at the protection of media workers. In addition to the general obligations to investigate 
and to punish following from States’ positive obligations under human rights law, a 
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requirement to create specific offences relating to the protection of media workers could be 
included. As with the CoE Convention on preventing and combating violence against women 
and domestic violence, States could be required to monitor and collate information relating to 
violence against journalists.187 It is arguable that if the problem underlying the persisting 
violations of journalists’ rights is political will, then a further legal norm adds nothing. 
However, in addition to emphasising the unacceptability of harassment of journalists and 
impunity therefor, it has the benefit of making it easier to identify whether States have 
complied with their international law obligations. The State reporting mechanism common to 
UN treaty-body procedures188 is based on this very assumption of exposing States to specific 
supervision in critical areas. A targeted instrument would thus highlight the significance of 
the fight against impunity, and emphasise where States are failing.  
The novelty of our proposal is therefore two-fold. First, it provides support for a 
process of codification which, without amounting to the adoption of substantially new laws, 
would address the loopholes and ambiguities noted in the current international framework for 
the protection of journalists’ freedom of expression. Secondly, it proposes a more efficient 
mechanism for oversight of those new treaty provisions, which includes a body meeting on a 
more regular basis than UNESCO,189 with a precise focus on the safety of media workers, 
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and upon which greater enforcement powers are bestowed. The main options in this respect 
include a judicial body and an Ombudsperson competent to carry out inquiries in response to 
individual or collective complaints, as well as to adopt reports containing the reasoned 
findings of investigations and any recommendations to States. The difficulty with the 
adoption of a tribunal-like mechanism is that it would most likely encounter the same 
problems of standing vis-à-vis the public interest that we have demonstrated exists in relation 
to the general freedom of expression guarantees. We would therefore propose the 
introduction of an Ombudsperson. Of course, even here there may be questions about 
standing; we suggest that the Ombudsperson should be afforded some margin of discretion in 
assessing the evidence presented to the Ombudsperson’s Office in order to decide which 
complaints to investigate further.  As a formal model in this respect, we could look mutatis 
mutandis to the competence conferred on the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
by the Rome Statute.190 Another useful precedent is the Committee recently established under 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, who has a 
dual competence: legal determinations in respect of individual complaints brought by the 
alleged victims, but also recommendations following investigations into grave or systematic 
violations reported by any credible sources, not necessarily the victims. The body monitoring 
conformity with the proposed convention on the safety of journalists could be similarly 
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entrusted with two procedures, a victim-activated mechanism and a non-victim track for 
grave or systematic violations. 
Certainly, the design of a new instrument and its dedicated enforcement machinery 
presuppose additional financial resources. Any costs, however, are greatly outweighed by the 
advantages such developments would bring about: 1) certainty, clarity and prominence of 
international obligations concerning the protection of journalists in conflict and non-conflict 
situations, currently fragmented in a multitude of treaty provisions, pronouncements of 
international tribunals, and soft law instruments, largely inaccessible to political decision-
makers and law-enforcement personnel; 2) enhanced international monitoring of all such 
obligations and specialised avenues for complaints in case of violation, including a 
mechanism operating with independence from the victims’ ability or willingness to denounce 
a violation; and 3) a momentous political statement from the international community, which 
translates into greater peer pressure to comply with the agreed obligations. The suggestion 
that any financial effort would be better placed with the implementation of existing rules and 
mechanisms is patently belied by the reality of continued attacks perpetrated with impunity, 
as recently lamented in a number of authoritative international instruments, such as the UN 
General Assembly Resolution 70/162 of 17 December 2015 on the safety of journalists and 
the issue of impunity and UN Human Rights Council Resolution 33/2 of 29 September 2016. 
These instruments also call upon States to address the specific risks of intimidation and 
violence faced by journalists as a result of their professional activity. One effective way to do 
so would be to identify, and commit to comply with, a set of specific obligations reflecting 
the state of the law on media professionals’ rights, as updated by the practice of States and 
international jurisprudence, as well as to intensify the collective oversight by means of a 
specialised mechanism. The merit of the solution we propose in this paper is that it allows 
access not only to the journalist-victim in pursuit of a remedy, but also to members of the 
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public – a solution which would better reflect the societal detriment caused by the violation 
of the individual victim’s free speech rights.     
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Our central argument in propounding further protection for media workers is based on the 
specificity and vulnerability of this group, as well as on the general observation that whatever 
protection is available has proved insufficient. While the general human rights and 
humanitarian regimes in principle cover actions against media workers, they have been 
ineffective. Admittedly, some of the treaty-based monitoring bodies have recognised the 
relationship between violent attacks and journalists’ freedom of expression. Others, however, 
have not, and this constitutes a gap in the jurisprudence. In terms of global protection, such 
unevenness is problematic. Moreover, all systems have underplayed the audience’s right to be 
informed. These weaknesses are compounded by impunity, and international bodies, 
especially the ECtHR, have not always given impunity’s societal implications sufficient 
weight.  Some change in the environment may be effected were the courts to recognise the 
specificity of the contribution and risks inherent in the exercise of free speech by journalists, 
and to allow audiences greater rights; however some aspects are difficult to fully protect 
within a framework of individual rights or humanitarian law, no matter how effective its 
mechanisms. International humanitarian law also inadequately recognises the specific risks 
faced by media workers in conflict zones.  In the end, therefore, it seems that a specific 
instrument is necessary. 
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The substance of our proposal is hardly new – as can be seen from the ‘Montecatini 
project’ of the Fédération Internationale des Rédacteurs en Chef191 or the Press Emblem 
Campaign’s Draft Proposal for an International Convention to Strengthen the Protection of 
Journalists in Zones of Armed Conflicts and Civil Unrest.192 The failure of such previous 
attempts only confirms the legal difficulties surrounding the status of journalists but does not 
suggest the redundancy of codification. Our endeavour thus consists in articulating new 
arguments to support the case for dedicated international protection for the media. UNSC 
Resolution 2222 (2015), highlighting the need to recognise the precarious position of 
journalists in conflict zones, might be construed as a tardy acknowledgment by the 
international community, faced with the reality of unacceptable numbers of journalist 
casualties, that insufficient attention has been paid to this category so far.  
Despite the problems of enforcement of treaty law, normative change eventually 
triggers behavioural change. A coherent global instrument protecting media freedom, insofar 
as indicative of international values, may provide leverage for legal argument before national 
courts and within civil society debate, which may ultimately be transformative in terms of 
State legislation and policy. Furthermore, such an instrument could act as a more compelling 
behaviour-modifier within the international society than the existing general regimes.  
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